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Patient Knowledge and Antibiotic Abuse: Evidence from an Audit Study in China

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  • Janet Currie
  • Wanchuan Lin
  • Wei Zhang

Abstract

We ask how patient knowledge of appropriate antibiotic usage affects both physicians prescribing behavior and the physician-patient relationship. We conduct an audit study in which a pair of simulated patients with identical flu-like complaints visits the same physician. Simulated patient A is instructed to ask a question that showcases his/her knowledge of appropriate antibiotic use, whereas patient B is instructed to say nothing beyond describing his/her symptoms. We find that a patient's knowledge of appropriate antibiotics use reduces both antibiotic prescription rates and drug expenditures. Such knowledge also increases physicians' information provision about possible side effects, but has a negative impact on the quality of the physician-patient interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Janet Currie & Wanchuan Lin & Wei Zhang, 2010. "Patient Knowledge and Antibiotic Abuse: Evidence from an Audit Study in China," NBER Working Papers 16602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16602
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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