Hospital Competition under Regulated Prices: Application to Urban Health Sector Reforms in China
We develop a model of public-private hospital competition un- der regulated prices, recognizing that hospitals are multi-service Þrms and that equilibria depend on the interactions of patients, hospital administrators, and physicians. We then use data from China to calibrate a simulation model of the impact of China?s recent payment and organizational reforms on cost, quality and access. Both the analytic and simulation results show how provid- ing implicit insurance through distorted prices leads to over/under use of services by proÞtability, which in turn fuels cost escalation and reduces access for those who cannot a?ord to self-pay for care. Hospital competition for patients will improve social welfare only if policymakers pay careful attention to payment incentives and regulation.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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