Mismeasurement in Pay-for-Performance: Evidence from an Intervention to Reduce Health Care Spending in China
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Currie, Janet & Lin, Wanchuan & Zhang, Wei, 2011.
"Patient knowledge and antibiotic abuse: Evidence from an audit study in China,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 933-949.
- Janet Currie & Wanchuan Lin & Wei Zhang, 2010. "Patient Knowledge and Antibiotic Abuse: Evidence from an Audit Study in China," NBER Working Papers 16602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan Feng Lu, 2012. "Multitasking, Information Disclosure, and Product Quality: Evidence from Nursing Homes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 673-705, September.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Mark V. Pauly, 1991. "Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers," Papers 0015, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- S. Mahendra Dev, 2008. "India," Chapters,in: Handbook on the South Asian Economies, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Karen Eggleston & Li Ling & Meng Qingyue & Magnus Lindelow & Adam Wagstaff, 2008.
"Health service delivery in China: a literature review,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 149-165.
- Eggleston, Karen & Ling, Li & Qingyue, Meng & Lindelow, Magnus & Wagstaff, Adam, 2006. "Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3978, The World Bank.
- Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality When Motivation Is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2875-2910, December.
- Toshiaki Iizuka, 2007. "Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 844-862, September.
- Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," NBER Working Papers 18804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2010.
"Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 64-91.
- Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2009. "Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers," NBER Working Papers 14886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, 1996.
"Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 99-123, Spring.
- Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, 1994. "Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery," NBER Working Papers 4933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- De Geyndt, W. & Zhao, X. & Liu, S., 1992. "From Barefoot Doctor to Village Doctor in Rural China," Papers 187, World Bank - Technical Papers.
- Y. Wang, 2006. "Price competition in the chinese pharmaceutical market," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 119-129, June.
- Lundin, Douglas, 2000. "Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 639-662, September.
- Dranove, David, 1988. "Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 281-298, April.
- McGuire, Thomas G. & Pauly, Mark V., 1991. "Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 385-410.
- Eijkenaar, Frank & Emmert, Martin & Scheppach, Manfred & Schöffski, Oliver, 2013. "Effects of pay for performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 115-130.
More about this item
Keywordspay-for-performance; physician incentives; drug prescription; China’s health care system;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-07-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-ALL-2014-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CNA-2014-07-28 (China)
- NEP-HRM-2014-07-28 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-TRA-2014-07-28 (Transition Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:201409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/derutus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.