Political Rivalry Effects on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality: A New Political Economy Approach

We propose an endogenous growth model with elements of new political economy in order to study the effects of political institutions and political rivalry on human capital accumulation and income inequality. Relating to the increasing literature on the relationship between income redistribution, inequality and growth, and on the political economy of growth, our model shows that (i) non-distortionary redistribution via public education equalizes income levels and increases human capital accumulation; (ii) political rivalry produces negative outcomes in all dimensions of the considered economic interactions. In particular, we find that occurring episodes of political rivalry reduce human capital accumulation through their negative impact on public investments in education, workers' wages and individual learning choice, and increase income inequality. As regards the role of political institutions, our analysis suggests that the elasticities of human capital accumulation with respect to public and private investments have crucial implications for public policies and require particular attention to the political rivalry effects.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)