Self-financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure
This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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References listed on IDEAS
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