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Self‐financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure

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  • Helge Sanner

Abstract

. This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self‐financing unemployment insurance (UI). For this purpose, we compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the relative size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Helge Sanner, 2003. "Self‐financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(2), pages 229-246, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:17:y:2003:i:2:p:229-246
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9914.00228
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Fenge & Max Friese, 2018. "Should Unemployment Insurance be Centralized in a State Union?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6898, CESifo.
    2. Do Truong Giang, 2004. "Tariffs and export subsidies in a spatial economic model," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 65, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    3. Wolfgang Wagner, 1999. "Vergleich von ringförmiger und sektoraler Stadtstruktur bei Nachbarschaftsexternalitäten im monozentrischen System," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 32, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    4. Klaus Schöler, 2007. "Gibt es eine optimale Stadtgröße?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 89, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    5. Norbert Eickhof, 2003. "Globalisierung, institutioneller Wettbewerb und nationale Wirtschaftspolitik," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 52, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    6. Norbert Eickhof & Kathrin Isele, 2005. "Do Economists Matter? Eine politökonomische Analyse des Einflusses wettbewerbspolitischer Leitbilder auf die europäische Fusionskontrolle," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 74, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    7. Verena L. Holzer, 2004. "Does the German Renewable Energies Act fulfil Sustainable Development Objectives?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 73, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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