Bargaining Structure and Regional Unemployment Insurance
This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:||May 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Labour, Vol. 17.2 (2003), pp. 229-246 (revised version)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.uni-potsdam.de/fakultaeten/wiso.html
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