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Hidden Regret In Insurance Markets

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  • Rachel J. Huang
  • Alexander Muermann
  • Larry Y. Tzeng

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  • Rachel J. Huang & Alexander Muermann & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2016. "Hidden Regret In Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 181-216, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:83:y:2016:i:1:p:181-216
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    23. Arthur Snow, 2009. "On the Possibility of Profitable Self‐Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 249-259, June.
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    25. Zeelenberg, M., 1999. "Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behavioral decision-making," Other publications TiSEM 38371d1b-31fd-45b0-860f-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    26. Carlos Laciana & Elke Weber, 2008. "Correcting expected utility for comparisons between alternative outcomes: A unified parameterization of regret and disappointment," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-17, February.
    27. Rachel J Huang & Yu-Jane Liu & Larry Y Tzeng, 2010. "Hidden Overconfidence and Advantageous Selection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 35(2), pages 93-107, December.
    28. Michenaud, Sébastien & Solnik, Bruno, 2008. "Applying regret theory to investment choices: Currency hedging decisions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 677-694, September.
    29. Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, 2007. "Overconfidence, Insurance, and Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1994-2004, December.
    30. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2010. "Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 187-211, August.
    31. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
    32. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    33. Muermann, Alexander & Mitchell, Olivia S. & Volkman, Jacqueline M., 2006. "Regret, portfolio choice, and guarantees in defined contribution schemes," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 219-229, October.
    34. Loomes, Graham & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1992. "Are Preferences Monotonic? Testing Some Predictions of Regret Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 17-33, February.
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    37. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
    38. Simonson, Itamar, 1992. "The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase Decisions," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 19(1), pages 105-118, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Armantier, Olivier & Foncel, Jérôme & Treich, Nicolas, 2023. "Insurance and portfolio decisions: Two sides of the same coin?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 201-219.
    2. Christina Aperjis & Filippo Balestrieri, 2017. "Loss aversion leading to advantageous selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 203-227, December.
    3. Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
    4. Fujii, Yoichiro & Okura, Mahito & Osaki, Yusuke, 2021. "Is insurance normal or inferior? -A regret theoretical approach-," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    5. Korn, Olaf & Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2016. "Hedging with regret," CFR Working Papers 16-06, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    6. Gemmo, Irina & Browne, Mark J. & Gründl, Helmut, 2017. "Transparency aversion and insurance market equilibria," ICIR Working Paper Series 25/17, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    7. Huang, Rachel J. & Jeng, Vivian & Wang, Cheng-Wei & Yue, Jack C., 2021. "Does size and book-to-market contain intangible information about managerial incentives? Learning from corporate D&O insurance purchase," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Chen, Bingzheng & Feng, Frank Y. & Powers, Michael R. & Qiu, Joseph, 2019. "Risk-revealing contracts for government-sponsored microinsurance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    9. Korn, Olaf & Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2019. "Hedging with regret," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 192-205.

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