IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y2003i69p119-142.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance

Author

Listed:
  • Bertrand Villeneuve

Abstract

ln the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Villeneuve, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 69, pages 119-142.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:119-142
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076366
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Ray Rees & Patricia Apps, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance markets, CHERE Working Paper 2006/3," Working Papers 2006/3, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney.
    3. Arthur Snow, 2009. "On the Possibility of Profitable Self‐Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 249-259, June.
    4. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2015. "Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 247-278, August.
    5. Barelli, Paulo & Basov, Suren & Bugarin, Mauricio & King, Ian King, 2010. "The Inclusiveness of Exclusion," Insper Working Papers wpe_211, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    6. Michael Sonnenholzner & Achim Wambach, 2009. "On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market With Asymmetric Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-341, June.
    7. Ma, Ben-jiang & Qiu, Chun-guang & Bi, Wen-jie, 2015. "An insurance contract with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 67-74.
    8. Rachel J. Huang & Alexander Muermann & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2016. "Hidden Regret In Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 181-216, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:119-142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.