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Hidden Overconfidence and Advantageous Selection


  • Rachel J Huang

    () (Graduate Institute of Finance, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, #43 Sec. 4, Keelung Road, Taipei, 106, Taiwan.)

  • Yu-Jane Liu

    (Department of Finance, Guanghua School, Peking University, 5, Yiheyan Rd Haidian District, Beijing, 100871, China)

  • Larry Y Tzeng

    (Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, 85, SEC 4, Roosevelt Rd, Taipei, 106, Taiwan)


Theories of adverse selection and moral hazard predict the occurrence of the risk and the coverage of the insurance should be positively correlated, whereas empirical researches find little support of it. This paper provides a theoretical model of hidden overconfidence and demonstrates that a competitive insurance market may settle on separating equilibrium with advantageous selection predicting a negative relationship between risk and coverage. By assuming heterogeneity in risk perception and hidden action on self-protection, we find that, in equilibrium, the rational type of individual takes precautions to reduce the loss probability, whereas the overconfident type of individual will not make any effort. In the separating equilibrium, the insurer provides a product with high coverage to attract rational type of individual (low risk), and a product with low coverage for overconfident type of individual (high risk). In addition, other types of equilibrium such as adverse selection or linear premium rate are also found.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel J Huang & Yu-Jane Liu & Larry Y Tzeng, 2010. "Hidden Overconfidence and Advantageous Selection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 35(2), pages 93-107, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:35:y:2010:i:2:p:93-107

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    Cited by:

    1. Gemmo, Irina & Browne, Mark J. & Gr√ľndl, Helmut, 2017. "Transparency aversion and insurance market equilibria," ICIR Working Paper Series 25/17, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    2. Jing Ai & Lin Zhao & Wei Zhu, 2016. "Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 41(2), pages 107-148, September.
    3. Rachel J. Huang & Alexander Muermann & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2016. "Hidden Regret In Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 181-216, January.

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