Endogenous Election Timing In Majoritarian Parliamentary Systems
The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning. Copyright 1996 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 8 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
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