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Fighting Battles, Winning Wars

Author

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  • Alastair Smith

    (Department of Political Science, Washington University)

Abstract

The author models warfare as a random-walk stochastic process. Rather than model war as a single-shot lottery, as is common in the literature, nations fight a series of battles. Nations do not defeat their foe in a single battle; rather, victory results from aggregate success over a series of interactions. Only by gradually reducing an opponent's capacity to resist can a nation force victory. Yet, under many circumstances, nations preempt defeat by surrendering once the tide of war moves against them. The author characterizes the distribution of resources that results in conflict. Against this background, the author examines how the preferences of leaders affect the conditions under which war occurs. Because the preferences of leaders affect the pattern of conflict, citizens' electoral choices are made contingent on the international environment. Hence, the author provides a link between conflict behavior and domestic electoral processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Smith, 1998. "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 301-320, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:3:p:301-320
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam III, 1998. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 259-277, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Häfner, Samuel, 2012. "Clausewitz on Auctions," Working papers 2012/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

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