Clausewitz on Auctions
A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conﬂicts, yields new theoretical justiﬁcation for existing empirical ﬁndings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battleﬁeld behavior.
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