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Why gender norms matter

Author

Listed:
  • Ryo Sakamoto
  • Miki Kohara

Abstract

This study examines the influence of gender norms on household behaviour and welfare. Using Japanese household data, we find that households with a conventional norm on gender roles spend more time on housework and less money on family‐common goods. To understand the underlying mechanism, we construct a collective labour supply model that explicitly introduces gender norms. We show that an inefficient ratio of wives' household time to that of husbands leads to an increase in the shadow price of domestic goods, through which the norm distorts the time and money allocated to home production and decreases household welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Sakamoto & Miki Kohara, 2025. "Why gender norms matter," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 92(365), pages 150-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:92:y:2025:i:365:p:150-172
    DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12551
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masato Oikawa & Takumi Toyono & Haruko Noguchi & Akira Kawamura, 2025. "When women work, children thrive: Gender-specific employment shocks and child abuse deaths," Working Papers 2523, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    2. Belloc, Ignacio & Molina, José Alberto & Velilla, Jorge, 2025. "Inheritance Shocks and Expenditure Patterns: A Dynamic Collective Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 18243, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Ignacio Belloc & Pierre-André Chiappori & José Alberto Molina & Jorge Velilla, 2025. "Effects of wage shocks and saving changes on leisure time: The role of dynamic intra-household commitment," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1099, Boston College Department of Economics.

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