Collective Labor Supply, Divisions of Domestic Work and Intra-household Bargaining

This paper analyzes the impact of intra-household bargaining on the labor supply of heterosexual couples with different divisions of domestic work. The objective is to compare the decision-making process in families with egalitarian, traditional, and non-traditional gender role attitudes towards the division of domestic work. Data from Uruguay shows that couples of all types are sensitive to bargaining power shifts, as measured by the non-labor income difference between cohabiting partners and married couples. Results suggest that a relatively rich male has more bargaining power and supplies less labor, and the opposite is true for his partner. In addition, being married reduces the labor supply of women and increases that of men in egalitarian households. These results are robust to selection into employment correction. Finally, less gender-normative households assign a larger share of non-labor income to women after the negotiation process.