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Reputation and Production Standards

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  • McCluskey, Jill J.
  • Loureiro, Maria L.

Abstract

This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the production standards. These types of products are usually known as credence goods. The steady-state level of quality with credence goods is found to be lower than that with experience goods, and perfect information goods. The finding that only perceived quality, which is effectively a filtered version of true quality, affects reputation indicates rewards for high quality production are lower in the credence good case. Further, an increase in the level of monitoring can increase the true level of product quality in the market for credence goods.

Suggested Citation

  • McCluskey, Jill J. & Loureiro, Maria L., 2005. "Reputation and Production Standards," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 30(1), pages 1-11, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30788
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30788
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Megan E. Waldrop & Jill J. McCluskey & Ron C. Mittelhammer, 2017. "Products with multiple certifications: insights from the US wine market," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 44(4), pages 658-682.
    2. Sergey Belev & Olga Boldareva & Ilya Sokolov & Anna Zolotareva, 2013. "Features of the Public Procurements of Innovation Products in Russian and the World," Published Papers 166, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
    3. Corsi, Alessandro & Frontuto, Vito & Novelli, Silvia, 2022. "Relational goods and direct purchase from farmers: estimating the value of the relationship between consumers and producers," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 25(2), March.
    4. Dai, Yunhao & Kong, Dongmin & Wang, Maobin, 2013. "Investor reactions to food safety incidents: Evidence from the Chinese milk industry2We thank Colin Poulton (Managing Editor), two anonymous referees, Martin Qiu, Shasha Liu, and Yan Sheng for helpful," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 23-31.
    5. Carola Grebitus & Ellen J. Van Loo, 2022. "Relationship between cognitive and affective processes, and willingness to pay for pesticide‐free and GMO‐free labeling," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 407-421, May.
    6. Cuffaro, Nadia & Di Giacinto, Marina, 2015. "Credence goods, consumers’ trust in regulation and high quality exports," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 4(2), pages 1-19, August.
    7. Galloway, Kristin & Bailey, DeeVon, 2005. "A Rose by Another Name: An Objective Analysis of an Established Market for Credence Attributes," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19493, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Grolleau, Gilles & Caswell, Julie A., 2006. "Interaction Between Food Attributes in Markets: The Case of Environmental Labeling," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1-14, December.
    9. Pozo, Veronica F. & Saak, Alexander E. & Hanawa-Peterson, Hikaru, 2009. "Product Origin and Reputation for Quality: the Case of Organic Foods," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49503, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    10. Kira J.M. Matus & Michael Veale, 2022. "Certification systems for machine learning: Lessons from sustainability," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(1), pages 177-196, January.
    11. Gelaw, Fekadu & Speelman, Stijn & Van Huylenbroeck, Guido, 2016. "Farmers’ marketing preferences in local coffee markets: Evidence from a choice experiment in Ethiopia," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 92-102.
    12. Matus, Kira & Veale, Michael, 2021. "Certification Systems for Machine Learning: Lessons from Sustainability," SocArXiv pm3wy, Center for Open Science.
    13. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2019. "Testing by Competitors in Enforcement of Product Standards," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1735-1751, April.

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