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Citations for "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games"

by Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. José Penalva & Michael D. Ryall, 2001. "Causal Assessment in Finite Extensive-form Games," Economics Working Papers 483, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alvaro Sandroni, . ""Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis''," CARESS Working Papres 95-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1992. "Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions," Discussion Papers 983, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Yossi Feinberg & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "Rate of Arbitrage and Reconciled Beliefs," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-12. [Downloadable!]
  5. Felipe Pérez, 1998. "- Private Experience In Adaptive Learning Models," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  8. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Information Transmission In Elimination Contests," Working Papers 0511, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. José J. Sempere Monerris & Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz, 1998. "- Duopoly Price Communication," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  10. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  11. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Felipe Perez, 1997. "Private Experience in Adaptive Learning Models," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1403, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  13. John H. Nachbar, 2003. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 0597, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jose Penalva-Zuasti & Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Causal Assessment in Finite-length Extensive-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000074, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997. "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Game Theory and Information 9711004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Fehr, Dietmar & Kübler, Dorothea & Danz, David N., 2008. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game," IZA Discussion Papers 3627, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  18. Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996. "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information 9610004, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 1996. [Downloadable!]
  19. Heller, Yuval, 2009. "Justifiable choice," MPRA Paper 15645, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  20. Nyarko, Y., 1998. "The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games," Working Papers 98-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  21. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  22. József Sákovics, 2001. "Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  24. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
  25. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  26. Patrick Leoni, . "Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game," IEW - Working Papers iewwp215, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  27. Ramon Marimon & Ellen McGrattan, 1993. "On Adaptive Learning in Strategic Games," Economics Working Papers 24, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.