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Inductive game theory: A basic scenario

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  • Kaneko, Mamoru
  • Kline, J. Jude

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called "inductive game theory". A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we present a more entire picture of the theory moving from the individual raw experiences, through the inductive derivation of a view, to the implications for future behavior. Our developments generate an experiential foundation for game theory and for Nash equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 44 (2008)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 1332-1363

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:12:p:1332-1363

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Experience Extensive game Information piece Memory function Induction Experiential foundation Nash equilibrium;

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References

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  1. Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1983. "Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 676, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Case-Based Decision Theory," Discussion Papers 994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Mamoru Kaneko, 2002. "Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 7-62.
  6. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868, September.
  7. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
  8. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  10. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December.
  11. Kaneko, Mamoru & Matsui, Akihiko, 1999. " Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 101-37.
  12. Nobu-Yuki Suzuki & Mamoru Kaneko, 2002. "Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 63-103.
  13. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-217, May.
  2. Kaneko, Mamoru & Mitra, Aniruddha, 2011. "Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 34-45, July.
  3. Mamoru Kaneko, 2013. "Symposium: logic and economics—interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 1-8, May.
  4. Mamoru Kaneko & J. Kline, 2013. "Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-59, May.
  5. Tai-Wei Hu, 2013. "Expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 9-25, May.
  6. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & Akiyama, Eizo, 2009. "Learning games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1739-1756, October.
  7. Kogure, Katsuo, 2013. "Impacts of Institutional Changes in Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime," CEI Working Paper Series 2012-13, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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