Causal Assessment in Finite Extensive-form Games

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Causal Assessment in Finite Extensive-form Games

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José Penalva
Michael D. Ryall

Abstract

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when the empirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behavior strategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization of empirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's information structure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributions it generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunity diagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a given extensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summary of the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 483.

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Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision: Sep 2003
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:483

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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