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Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario

Author

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  • Mamoru Kaneko

    (Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba)

  • J. Jude Kline

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Bond University)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we will give a more developed discourse of the theory. The paper is written to show one entire picture of the theory: From individual raw experiences, short-term memories to long-term memories, inductive derivation of individual views, classification of such views, decision making or modification of behavior based on a view, and repercussion from the modified play in the objective game. We focus on some clear-cut cases, forgetting a lot of possible variants, but will still give a lot of results. In order to show one possible discourse as a whole, we will ask the question of how Nash equilibrium is emerging from the viewpoint of inductive game theory, and will give one answer.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoru Kaneko & J. Jude Kline, 2006. "Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    • Handle: RePEc:sin:wpaper:06-a001
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    File URL: https://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/~econ/pdfPaper/06-A001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Simon Grant & John Quiggin, 2005. "Learning and Discovery," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP7R05, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
    3. J. Jude Kline & Thierry Lavendhomme & Samuel Waltener, 2019. "From memories to inductively derived views: a constructive approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 403-420, September.
    4. Kogure, Katsuo, 2013. "Impacts of Institutional Changes in Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime," CEI Working Paper Series 2012-13, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-217, May.
    6. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & Akiyama, Eizo, 2009. "Learning games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1739-1756, October.
    7. Nick Feltovich & Sobei H. Oda, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 260-277, August.
    8. Mamoru Kaneko & J. Kline, 2013. "Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 27-59, May.
    9. Mamoru Kaneko, 2013. "Symposium: logic and economics—interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 1-8, May.
    10. Kaneko, Mamoru & Mitra, Aniruddha, 2011. "Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 34-45, July.
    11. Tai-Wei Hu, 2013. "Expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 9-25, May.

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