Information Flows and Memory in Games
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Cited by:
- Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023.
"Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Julien Manili, 2021. "Belief change, Rationality, and Strategic Reasoning in Sequential Games," Working Papers 679, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2022-01-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-01-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2022-01-03 (Operations Research)
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