Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Jude Kline, J., 2002. "Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 278-305, February.
- van Benthem, Johan, 2001. "Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 219-48, October.
- E. Ray Canterbery, 1984. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 7(1), pages 4-6, October.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995.
"On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
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- Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868, September.
- Klaus Ritzberger, 1999. "Recall in extensive form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 69-87.
- Oliver Board, 2002.
"Dynamic Interactive Epistemology,"
Economics Series Working Papers
125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Igor Mouraviev & Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Working Papers 510, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2010.
"AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties,"
1017, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 567-592, August.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 914, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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