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Recall in extensive form games

Author

Listed:
  • Klaus Ritzberger

    (Institute for Advanced Studies, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria)

Abstract

This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets and that players do not forget what they knew nor what they did. Thus, if information sets are partially ordered, then perfect recall is implied by the player's inability to refine her information from the memory.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Ritzberger, 1999. "Recall in extensive form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 69-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:69-87
    Note: Received: August 1997/final version: September 1998
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2003. "A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 201-217, September.
    2. Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2020. "Backward induction in games without perfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 207-218.
    3. Peter A. Streufert, 2019. "Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 1-32, March.
    4. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Nicolò Generoso, 2021. "Information Flows and Memory in Games," Working Papers 678, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    5. Heymann, Benjamin & De Lara, Michel & Chancelier, Jean-Philippe, 2022. "Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 220-240.
    6. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
    7. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2004. "Memory and perfect recall in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 237-256, May.
    8. Iryna Topolyan, 2020. "On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 183-201, March.
    9. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizations of perfect recall," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 311-326, May.

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