Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 18 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 116-134
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Learning Rare Events," Discussion Papers 1199, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997.
"Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning,"
Discussion Papers
1177, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, EconWPA.
- Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Recurring Bullies," Discussion Papers 1151, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997.
"Social Learning in Recurring Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
- Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Discussion Papers 1138, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1999.
"Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 875-894, July.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1998. "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited," Discussion Papers 1228, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997.
"False Reputation in a Society of Players,"
Game Theory and Information
9711004, EconWPA.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997. "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Discussion Papers 1184R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 121-147, January.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Merging Economic Forecasts," Discussion Papers 1035, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alvaro Sandroni, . ""Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis''," CARESS Working Papres 95-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Dean Foster & H Peyton Young, 1999.
"On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
423, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2001.
- Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2001. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Working Papers 01-08-039, Santa Fe Institute.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1999. "Reputation versus Social Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 40-59, September.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "The Speed of Rational Learning," Discussion Papers 1192, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Learning, Rare Events, and Recurrent Market Crashes in Frictionless Economies without Intrinsic Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 1-18, September.
- Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
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