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Recurring Bullies

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Author Info
Matthew Jackson
Ehud Kalai

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Abstract

In a recurring game, a stage game is played consecutively by different groups of players, with each group receiving information about the play of earlier groups. Starting with uncertainty about the distribution of types in the population, late groups may learn to play a correct Bayesian equilibrium, as if they know the type distribution. This paper concentrates on Selten's Chain Store game and the Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, Wilson phenomenon, where a small perceived inaccuracy about the type distribution can drastically alter the equilibrium behavior. It presents sufficient conditions that prevent this phenomenon from persisting in a recurring setting.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1151.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1151.

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Date of creation: Apr 1995
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1151

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Discussion Papers 1138, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2002. "Incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 43, pages 1665-1686 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2001. "Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1124, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997. "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Game Theory and Information 9711004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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