1. Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Aumann, Robert J., 2005. "War and Peace," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-4, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
   • Robert J. Aumann, 2005. "War and Peace," Discussion Paper Series dp428, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
2. O. Gossner, 2000. "Sharing a long secret in a few public words," THEMA Working Papers 2000-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
3. Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling," Discussion Paper Series dp483, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro’'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002411, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9902001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
5. Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Spaced Out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Releases," Industrial Organization 0505008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
6. Abraham Neyman Null & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Departmental Working Papers 200514, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
8. O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
   • GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," CORE Discussion Papers 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
9. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 335-55.
11. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    • Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-36, March. [Downloadable!]
12. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Pedro Dal Bo, 2002. "Three Essays on Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000038, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
14. Pedro Dal Bo, 2001. "Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality," UCLA Economics Working Papers 802, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Pedro Bó, 2007. "Social norms, cooperation and inequality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Yuming Fu & Stephen Ching, 2001. "Examining Competition in Land Market: An Application of Event Study to Land Auctions in Hong Kong," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 01-01, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
16. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
17. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
18. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
19. Matthijs van Veelen, 2002. "Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-111/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
20. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
21. Gul, Faruk, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-74, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1992. "A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 989, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rubinstein, A. & Wolnsky, A., 1992. "A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Papers 4-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
24. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
26. James Bergin, 1986. "A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium Strategies in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 686, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Bergin, James, 1989. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Abreu, D. & Dutta, P.K. & Smith, L., 1992. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Working papers 92-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
28. Lawrence Ausubel & Raymond Deneckere, 1985. "One is Almost Enough for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 669, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.