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Spaced Out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Releases

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Author Info
Arthur Zillante (ICES, George Mason University)

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Abstract

An oft-neglected pattern of behavior occurs when firms time the release of their products so that they are not released on the same date. The practice is potentially collusive, so there may be legitimate antitrust concerns. This paper presents a model of this behavior, the alternating periods monopoly (APM). A comparison of the APM with other sustainable methods of collusion shows the conditions under which the APM is preferred. I develop an empirical test to detect the APM, and use data from the baseball card industry to investigate the possible use of an APM.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0505008.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 24 May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0505008

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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Keywords: Noncooperative strategies alternating periods monopoly duration analysis

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L - Industrial Organization

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    Other versions:
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  11. Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Survival in a Declining Industry: The Case of Baseball Cards," Industrial Organization 0505004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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