Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)

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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)

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Ichiro Obara

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Ichiro Obara

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 365.

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Date of creation: 29 Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:365

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2006-02-19 (Game Theory)

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George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September. [Downloadable!]
Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 265-299, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information 0107001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups," Working Papers gueconwpa~01-01-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
Other versions:
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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