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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)

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  • Ichiro Obara

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Obara/Obara365.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 365.

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Date of creation: 29 Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:365

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
  3. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
  4. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
  5. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November.
  6. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
  7. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  8. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information 0107001, EconWPA.
  9. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
  10. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
  11. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  12. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
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