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All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Uwe Dulleck () (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria )
Paul Frijters (Queensland University of Technology)
Konrad Podczeck (University of Vienna)
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We study all-pay auctions with budget-constrained bidders who have access to fair insurance before bidding simultaneously over a prize. We characterize a unique equilibrium for the special cases of two bidders and one prize, show existence and a heuristic for finding an equilibrium in the case of multiple bidders and multiple prizes. We end with an example of non-uniqueness of equilibria for the general case of multiple prizes and multiple players.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series Economics working papers with number
2006-13.
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Date of creation: Jul 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jku:econwp:2006_13Contact details of provider: Fax: +43 732-2468-8238 Web page: http://www.econ.jku.at/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: all-pay auctions ; fair lotteries ; political campaigning ; oligopoly ; regional competition ; patent races ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
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