This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Markets for Influence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Flavio Menezes () (Australian National University)
John Quiggin () (Risk & Sustainable Management Group, School of Economics, University of Queensland)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPR07_7.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland in its series Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers with number WP7R07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r07_7

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Colin Clark Building, no 39, St. Lucia, Qld. 4072
Phone: +61 7 3365 6601
Fax: +61 7 3365 6601
Web page: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/rsmg/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Quiggin).

Related research
Keywords: Tullock contests oligopoly

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.