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Markets for Influence

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  • Flavio Menezes

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Queensland)

  • John Quiggin

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Queensland)

Abstract

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent- seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for in?uence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland in its series Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers with number WPR09_2.

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Date of creation: Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r09_2

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  1. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
  2. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Dixon, Huw, 1986. "The Cournot and Bertrand Outcomes as Equilibria in a Strategic Metagame," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(380a), pages 59-70, Supplemen.
  4. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1993-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. " Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-88, September.
  9. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  10. Glenn C. Loury, 1976. "Market Structure and Innovation," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1994. " The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 363-80, December.
  12. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2004. "Games without Rules," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers, University of Queensland, School of Economics 151166, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  13. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  14. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-83, May.
  16. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2013. "Inferring the strategy space from market outcomes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers, University of Queensland, School of Economics 151206, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  2. Murray, Cameron K., 2012. "Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups," MPRA Paper 42070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2012. "The evolution of the mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 12/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  5. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2011. "More Competitors or more Competition? Market Concentration and the Intensity of Competition," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers, University of Queensland, School of Economics 151195, University of Queensland, School of Economics.

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