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A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”

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Author Info

  • Dechenaux, Emmanuel
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Lugovskyy, Volodymry

Abstract

In this note, we characterize the full set of Equilibria of the 2-firm patent race analyzed by Amaldoss and Jain (Management Science, 48(8), August 2002, pp. 972-991). Contrary to Amaldoss and Jain’s (2002) claim, we show that the equilibrium is not always unique and that the set of Equilibria is non-robust to changes in the (discrete) set of available strategies. In some Equilibria, the qualitative results are the reverse of those in the only equilibrium Amaldoss and Jain identify. Our findings have important implications for the analysis of the data from Amaldoss and Jain’s experiments, as well as other experiments appearing in the literature.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1162.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1162

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Related research

Keywords: All-Pay Auction ; Contests ; Experimental Economics ; Competitive Strategy ; R&D;

References

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1161, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  4. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1996. "Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 373-379, March.
  5. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  6. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, EconWPA 9809003, EconWPA.
  8. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1161, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Excess capacity and pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 67, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  3. HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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