Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Volodymyr Lugovskyy
• Dan Kovenock

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Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1162.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1162

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Keywords: All-Pay Auction ; Contests ; Experimental Economics ; Competitive Strategy ; R&D;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
2. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymyr, 2006. "Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 276-283, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1161, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
4. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1996. "Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 373-379, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
   Other versions:
   • Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995. "The All-pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
   • Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.