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All-Pay Auction Equilibria In Contests

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Author Info
José Alcalde () (Universidad de Alicante)
Matthias Dahm (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

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Abstract

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2007-27.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2007-27.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
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Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-27

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Related research
Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest; all-pay auction; contest success functions.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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  2. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David Malueg & Andrew Yates, 2006. "Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 719-727, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  8. Thomas Cusack & Amihai Glazer & Kai Konrad, 2007. "Introduction," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 179-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock And Hirshleifer: A Meeting Of The Minds," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Spatial contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 965-974, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Fang, Hanming, 2002. " Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
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  18. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
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Full references

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-124, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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