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Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss

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  • Dechenaux, Emmanuel
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Lugovskyy, Volodymry

Abstract

In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 483-521) analyze symmetric and asymmetric investment games similar to two-player all-pay auctions with bid caps. In this note, we correct an error in their characterization of the set of Nash Equilibria of their symmetric investment game. In particular, we find Equilibria that Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) fail to identify. Taking these Equilibria into account has important implications for the analysis of data from Rapoport and Amaldoss’s experiments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1161.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1161

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Related research

Keywords: All-Pay Auction ; Mixed strategies ; Discrete strategy space ; Bid caps ; Experiments;

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References

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  1. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1161, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1162, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  3. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  5. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2004. "Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 585-607, August.
  6. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, EconWPA 9809003, EconWPA.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Excess capacity and pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 67, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  3. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 573-590, 04.
  4. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1161, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  5. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2008. "In search of experimental support for an asymmetric equilibria solution in symmetric investment games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 200-203, July.
  7. HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  8. Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.
  9. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1162, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  10. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2012. "All-Pay Contests with Constraints," Working Papers, School Of Economics, University College Dublin 201204, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.

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