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Speculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime

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Author Info
Ivan Pastine (Bilkent University)

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Abstract

This paper investigates the extent to which it is possible for speculative attacks to be predictable given information on economic fundamentals. A standard model of predictable attacks is extended to incorporate an optimizing monetary authority. It is shown that while incorporating a forward-looking monetary authority improves our understanding of many observed phenomena, it also implies that the branch of the literature that places emphasis on predictable movements in fundamentals cannot generate predictable speculative attacks. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for an important empirical methodology.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0931.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0931

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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  2. Blackburn, Keith & Sola, Martin, 1993. " Speculative Currency Attacks and Balance of Payments Crises," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(2), pages 119-44, June.
  3. Velasco, Andres, 1997. "When are fixed exchange rates really fixed?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 5-25, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. F Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Model of the ERM Crisis," Discussion Papers 94/2, Department of Economics, University of York.
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  5. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M. & Kramer, Charles, 1996. "Collapsing exchange rate regimes: Another linear example," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 223-234, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benabou, Roland, 1989. "Optimal Price Dynamics and Speculation with a Storable Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 41-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Robert Flood & Nancy Marion, 1998. "Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis Literature," NBER Working Papers 6380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Davies, Gareth & Vines, David, 1995. "Equilibrium Currency Crises: Are Multiple Equilibria Self-fulfilling or History Dependent?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Guidotti, Pablo E & Vegh, Carlos A, 1999. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 23-51, February.
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  12. Andersen, Torben M, 1994. "Shocks and the Viability of a Fixed Exchange Rate Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Flood, Robert P & Garber, Peter M, 1984. "Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 90-107, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Velasco, Andres, 1994. "Are Balance of Payments Crises Rational?," Working Papers 94-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  15. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Robert P. Flood & Pierre-Richard Agénor & Jagdeep S. Bhandari, 1991. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises," IMF Working Papers 91/99, International Monetary Fund.
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  18. Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Are currency crises self-fulfilling?: A test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 263-286, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gara Minguez-Afonso, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 81-112, March. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Yuk-shing CHENG & Chi-shing CHAN & Chor-yiu SIN, 2004. "Currency attack/defense with two-sided private information," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 395, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Guimarães, Bernardo, 2007. "Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fernando Broner, 2003. "Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises," Economics Working Papers 839, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Bernardo Guimaraes, 2008. "Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil," CEP Discussion Papers dp0871, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tullio Gregori, 2009. "Currency crisis duration and interest defence," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(3), pages 256-267. [Downloadable!]
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