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Why Clashes Between Internal and External Stability Goals End in Currency Crises, 1797-1994

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Michael D. Bordo
Anna J. Schwartz

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Abstract

We argue that recent currency crises reflect clashes between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, just as did crises in the past. We reject the view that crises reflect self-fulfilling prophecies that are not closely related to measured fundamentals. Doubts about the timing of a market attack on a currency are less important than the fact that it is bound to happen if a government's policies are inconsistent with pegged exchange rates. We base these conclusions on a review of currency crises in the historical record under metallic monetary regimes and of crises post-World War II under Bretton Woods, and since, in European and Latin American pegged exchange rate regimes.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5710.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
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Publication status: published as Open Economies Review, Vol. 7 pp. 437-468, December 1996
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5710

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  1. Peter Kenen, 1996. "Analyzing and managing exchange-rate crises," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 469-492, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, 1996. "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: Empirical Indicators," NBER Working Papers 5437, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 73-96, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Garber, Peter M. & Grilli, Vittorio U., 1986. "The Belmont-Morgan Syndicate as an optimal investment banking contract," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 649-677, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Flood, Robert P & Garber, Peter M, 1984. "Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 90-107, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rose, Andrew K. & Svensson, Lars E. O., 1994. "European exchange rate credibility before the fall," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1185-1216, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1994. "Contagious Speculative Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Garber, Peter M, 1990. "Famous First Bubbles," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 35-54, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Drazen, Allan & Masson, Paul R, 1994. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Ozkan, F Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1994. "A Model of the ERM Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 879, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Blanco, Herminio & Garber, Peter M, 1986. "Recurrent Devaluation and Speculative Attacks on the Mexican Peso," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(1), pages 148-66, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Grilli, Vittorio, 1990. "Managing exchange rate crises: evidence from the 1890s," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 258-275, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Davies, Gareth & Vines, David, 1995. "Equilibrium Currency Crises: Are Multiple Equilibria Self-fulfilling or History Dependent?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1993. "The Unstable EMS," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1993-1), pages 51-144. [Downloadable!]
  19. Rudger Dornbusch & Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 1995. "Currency Crises and Collapses," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1995-2), pages 219-294. [Downloadable!]
  20. Michael D. Bordo & Bruce Mizrach & Anna J. Schwartz, 1995. "Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons from History," NBER Working Papers 5371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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