Equilibrium Currency Crises: Are Multiple Equilibria Self-fulfilling or History Dependent?
AbstractThe viability of a fixed exchange rate system is shown to be state- or shock-dependent. We show, simply, Obstfeld's claim that there may be multiple equilibria - multiple shock values for which a regime switch becomes optimal. We distinguish between self-fulfilling and history-dependent crises. In the former, crises may occur due to a jump from one equilibrium to another, even for constant model parameters, including the government's cost of quitting the regime. In the latter, costly expectational adjustment implies that the country's history, embodied in its initial expectations, determines the relevant equilibrium and the likelihood of a crisis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1239.
Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Peter Kenen, 1996. "Analyzing and managing exchange-rate crises," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 469-492, March.
- Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 1997. "Why Clashes Between Internal and External Stability Goals End in Currency Crises, 1797-1994," NBER Working Papers 5710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1995.
"Hyperinflation and stabilization: Cagan revisited,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
529, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Michael Bordo & Anna Schwartz, 1996. "Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises, 1797â€“1994," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 437-468, March.
- Pastine, Ivan, 2002.
"Speculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 197-229, June.
- Pastine, Ivan, 2001. "Speculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime," CEPR Discussion Papers 2893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ivan Pastine, 2000. "Speculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0931, Econometric Society.
- Mundaca,B.G. & Strand,J., 1999. "Speculative attacks in the exchange market with a band policy : a sequential game analysis," Memorandum 01/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Ozkan, F. Gulcin, 2003. "Explaining ERM realignments: Insights from optimising models of currency crises," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 491-507, December.
- Jesper Rangvid, 1997. "Deviations from long-run equilibria and probabilities of devaluations: An empirical analysis of Danish realignments," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 497-522, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.