Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues
AbstractIn exchange rate-based stabilization programs, credibility often follows a distinct time pattern. At first it rises as the highly visible nominal anchor provides a sense of stability and hopes run high for a permanent solution to fiscal problems. Later, as the domestic currency appreciates in real terms and the fiscal problems are not fully resolved, the credibility of the program falls, sometimes precipitously. This paper develops a political-economy model that focuses on the evolution of credibility over time, and is consistent with the pattern just described. Inflation inertia and costly budget negotiations play a key role. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Other versions of this item:
- Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA.
- Pablo Emilio Guidotti & Carlos A. VÃ©gh Gramont, 1992. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," IMF Working Papers 92/73, International Monetary Fund.
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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