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Essays on Political Economy of Political Reform

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  • Cesar Martinelli

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 625018000000000135.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000135

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References

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  1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Sebastian Edwards, 1992. "Sequencing and Welfare: Labor Markets and Agriculture," NBER Working Papers 4095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  4. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1991. "Credibility and Stabilization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 837-50, August.
  5. Lal, Deepak, 1987. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 1(2), pages 273-99, January.
  6. Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
  7. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
  8. Dani Rodrik, 1992. "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 87-105, Winter.
  9. Sebastian Edwards & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 1983. "The Welfare Effects of Trade and Capital Market Liberalization: Consequences of Different Sequencing Scenarios," NBER Working Papers 1245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Eaton, J., 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, And Credit Terms," ISER Discussion Paper 0223, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  11. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, 1985. "Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-24.
  12. Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 756-72, September.
  13. Van Wijnbergen, S., 1991. "Intertemporal Speculation , Shortages annd the Political Economy of Price Reform," Papers 9149, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  14. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  15. Ronald Findlay, 1990. "THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 193-221, 07.
  16. Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA.
  17. Michael Mussa, 1982. "Government Policy and the Adjustment Process," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 73-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Philippe Aghion & Olivier J. Blanchard, 1994. "On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9, pages 283-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
  20. Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Credibility of Trade Reform — a Policy Maker's Guide," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, 03.
  21. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1234-47, November.
  22. Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The Positive Economics of Policy Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 356-61, May.
  23. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 703-30, October.
  24. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  25. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August.
  26. Sachs, Jeffrey D, 1992. " The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 5-19.
  27. Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  28. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
  29. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November.
  30. repec:fth:osakae:223 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Sobel, Joel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 557-73, October.
  32. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  33. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
  34. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  35. Guillermo A. Calvo & Jacob A. Frenkel, 1991. "Credit Markets, Credibility, and Economic Transformation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 139-148, Fall.
  36. repec:fth:coluec:655 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Industry evolution and transition: the role of information capital," Staff Report 162, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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