Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina-Drazen Revisited

Contents:

Author Info

  • César Martinelli
  • Raúl Escorza

Abstract

In an influential article, Alesina and Drazen (1991) model delay of stabilization as the result of a struggle between political groups supporting reform plans with different distributional implications. In this paper we show that ex ante asymmetries in the costs of delay for the groups will reduce the probability of conflict and will lead to a shorter expected delay. Accurate common information about the cost of delay may lead to no delay at all. In an asymmetric conflict, a wider divergence in the distributional implications of reform will reduce the probability of conflict but will lead to a longer expected delay.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ciep.itam.mx/~martinel/attrition5.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000667.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000667

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3575, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1998. "Monetary policy and the well-being of the poor," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 159-201.
  4. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
  5. Hsieh, Chang-Tai, 2000. "Bargaining over reform," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1659-1676, October.
  6. Allan Drazen & Vittorio Grilli, 1990. "The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3527, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424, 04.
  8. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Where Did All The Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses," NBER Working Papers 6350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA.
  11. Barry Nalebuff & John G. Riley, 1984. "Asymmetric Equilibrium in the War of Attrition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 317, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
  14. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
  15. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-88, December.
  16. Alessandra Casella & Barry Eichengreen, 1994. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?," NBER Working Papers 4694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Raul Labán & Federico Sturzenegger, 1994. "Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation And Delayed Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 257-276, November.
  18. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  20. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Enrico Spolaore, 2004. "Adjustments in Different Government Systems," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 117-146, 07.
  22. Erosa, Andres & Ventura, Gustavo, 2002. "On inflation as a regressive consumption tax," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 761-795, May.
  23. Perraudin, William & Sibert, Anne, 2000. "The Timing of Multilateral Lending," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 192-211, January.
  24. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kentaro Katayama, 2008. "Delay in Fiscal Reform," Microeconomics Working Papers 23075, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  2. Grier, Kevin & Lin, Shu, 2009. "Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 540-546, December.
  3. Hannes Andréasson & Niklas Elert & Nils Karlson, 2013. "Does Social Cohesion Really Promote Reforms?," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 33, WWWforEurope.
  4. Stijn Goeminne & Benny Geys & Carine Smolders, 2008. "Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 297-315, June.
  5. Paulo Júlio, 2011. "Public Debt Stabilization: Redistributive Delays Versus Preemptive Anticipations," GEE Papers 0045, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos, Ministério da Economia e da Inovação, revised Dec 2011.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000667. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.