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Mass media and special interest groups

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  • Petrova, Maria

Abstract

Media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior. It is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups. However, existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias. We present a theoretical model that reconciles these results. The model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group, the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group, and media outlets’ reliance on subscription, in addition to advertising, revenues.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 84 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 17-38

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:84:y:2012:i:1:p:17-38

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Keywords: Mass media; Special interest groups; Advertisers;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maria Petrova, 2009. "Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press," Working Papers w0131, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Government Control of the Media," Working Papers w0126, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  3. Francesco Sobbrio, 2012. "A Citizen-Editors Model of News Media," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/61, European University Institute.
  4. A. Blasco & P. Pin & F. Sobbrio, 2011. "Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports," Working Papers wp772, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. A. Blasco & F. Sobbrio, 2011. "Competition and Commercial Media Bias," Working Papers wp767, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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