Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence
AbstractHow is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of ‘direct’ (lobbying the government) and ‘indirect’ (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and the growing public environmental awareness.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 03-07.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 04 Jul 2003
Date of revision: Jan 2005
Publication status: Published: Revised version in Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 2005), pp. 269–286
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-POL-2003-09-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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