Media versus Special Interests
AbstractWe argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14360.
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-09-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CUL-2008-09-29 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-09-29 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2010.
"Disclosure by Politicians,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 179-209, April.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2009. "Disclosure by Politicians," NBER Working Papers 14703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & López-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2009. "Disclosure by Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Florian Buck, 2014. "Financial Regulation and the Grabbing Hand," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(4), pages 03-13, 01.
- Karen Moris, 2010. "La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire - Press as a disciplinary governance mechanism," Working Papers FARGO 1101003, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.