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La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire - Press as a disciplinary governance mechanism

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  • Karen Moris

    (Université de Bourgogne LEG/Fargo)

Abstract

(VF)Pour les entreprises, les fraudes représentent des coûts importants. Leur révélation par la presse permettrait d’améliorer leur rentabilité. Nous nous sommes demandé comment et pourquoi la presse française remplit le rôle de mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire en tant que «chien de garde». Pour ce faire, son efficacité dans la révélation des fraudes commises par les entreprises, avant les juridictions officielles, a été étudiée. Il ressort que son efficacité dépend de sa recherche de maximisation du profit. Elle sélectionne les entreprises qu’elle suit et les fraudes qu’elle révèle publiquement.(VA)For firms, frauds are high costs. Their detection by press would improve their rates of return. We wondered how and why the French press plays the role of corporate disciplinary governance mechanism as watchdog. In this perspective, we investigated their efficiency in the detection of frauds committed by firm, before an official authority did. We find that the efficiency of press depends on its search for profit maximisation. The press selects the firms on which it publishes articles and the frauds that it publicly reveals.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen Moris, 2010. "La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire - Press as a disciplinary governance mechanism," Working Papers CREGO 1101003, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1101003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernance d’entreprise; presse; fraude; corporate governance; press; fraud.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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