What do the papers sell?
AbstractWe model the market for news as a two-sided market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to advertisers who value advert-receptive readers. We show that monopolistic newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces advertiser profits. Newspaper competition generally reduces the impact of advertising. In fact, as the size of advertising grows, newspapers may paradoxically reduce advertiser bias, due to increasing competition for readers. However, advertisers can counter this effect of competition by committing to news-sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much under-reporting as in the monopoly case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 800.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision: Feb 2006
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Two-sided markets; advertising; media accuracy; media bias; media economics.;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
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