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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018. "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers pme809, Job Market Papers.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  3. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Information Acquisition Towards Unanimous Consent," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
  4. Arianna Degan & Ming Li & Huan Xie, 2023. "An experimental investigation of persuasion through selective disclosure of evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1490-1516, November.
  5. Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Assortative Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2020-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
  7. Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2023. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2182-2197, April.
  8. Kocourek, Pavel & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2024. "Boundedly rational demand," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
  9. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
  10. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  11. Philipp Denter & Martin Dumav & Boris Ginzburg, 2021. "Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 2033-2057.
  12. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  13. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
  14. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
  15. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  16. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023. "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 399-433, February.
  18. Juan Passadore & Juan Xandri, 2019. "Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games," 2019 Meeting Papers 1345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  19. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2025. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(1), pages 195-228, January.
  20. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.
  21. Shihong Xiao & Ying-Ju Chen & Christopher S. Tang, 2022. "Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5025-5048, July.
  22. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Censorship as Optimal Persuasion," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201903, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 05 Mar 2020.
  23. Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
  24. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  25. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  26. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "Optimal information censorship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 377-385.
  27. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  28. Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  29. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3363-3385, November.
  30. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
  31. Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  32. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
  33. David Lingenbrink & Krishnamurthy Iyer, 2019. "Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 1397-1416, September.
  34. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2021. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  35. repec:osf:socarx:w6vam_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Lyu, Chen, 2023. "Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  37. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.
  38. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
  39. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
  40. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
  41. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2024. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 151-166, January.
  42. Manxi Wu & Saurabh Amin & Asuman E. Ozdaglar, 2021. "Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 148-163, January.
  43. Caio Lorecchio, 2022. "Persuading crowds," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/434, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
  44. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  45. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120989, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
  46. Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi, 2022. "Two-sided strategic information transmission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 229-241.
  47. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  48. Candogan, Ozan & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  49. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  50. Liu, Yixuan & Whinston, Andrew B., 2019. "Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 14-26.
  51. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  52. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  53. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  54. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  55. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
  56. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  57. Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers 2105.09375, arXiv.org.
  58. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
  59. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2016. "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 597-601, May.
  60. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  61. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  62. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  63. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
  64. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  65. Alfredo Di Tillio & Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2017. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 266-304, October.
  66. Dmitry Sedov, 2023. "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 505-546, September.
  67. Yang, Kai Hao, 2021. "Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  68. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
  69. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  70. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
  71. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2018. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Discussion Papers 2018-06, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  72. Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  73. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  74. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120364, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
  75. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  76. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
  77. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  78. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2017. "A Game of Random Variables," Papers 1712.08716, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.
  79. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Righi, Simone, 2019. "The price of discovering your needs online," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 317-330.
  80. Kun Heo & Antoine Zerbini, 2024. "Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes," Discussion Papers 2024-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
  81. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
  82. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  83. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
  84. Habibi, Amir, 2020. "Motivation and information design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 1-18.
  85. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  86. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  87. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  88. Meng, Delong, 2021. "Learning from like-minded people," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 231-250.
  89. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
  90. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  91. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  92. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
  93. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  94. Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  95. Min, Daehong, 2023. "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 73-100.
  96. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2017. "Beeps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 31-53, January.
  97. Kolotilin, Anton, 2018. "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
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