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Citations for "Implementation with evidence"

by Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier

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  1. Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
  2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Clausen, Andrew, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  5. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  7. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 8771, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  8. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  9. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, 05.
  10. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
  12. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00943301, HAL.
  13. Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  14. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  15. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  16. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  18. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  19. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  20. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
  21. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  22. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  23. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
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