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Implementation with evidence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
  2. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," MPRA Paper 48234, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Jul 2013.
  5. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
  7. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  8. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  9. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  10. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  12. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
  13. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Treading a Fine Line : (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals," Discussion Paper Series 651, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  14. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Clausen, Andrew, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  16. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
  18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  19. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-15, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  20. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
  21. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  22. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
  23. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
  24. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  25. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  26. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal," Discussion Paper Series 616, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  27. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
  28. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  29. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  30. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
  31. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "National implementation with partially honest agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  32. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
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