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Citations for "Implementation with evidence"

by Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier

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  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Treading a Fine Line : (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals," Discussion Paper Series 651, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Post-Print halshs-01310223, HAL.
  3. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  5. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
  6. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00943301, HAL.
  7. Pablo Amorós, 2015. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Working Papers 2015-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  8. Andrew Clausen, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," ESE Discussion Papers 225, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  9. Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
  10. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  11. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  12. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  13. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper Series 592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  14. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 8771, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  15. Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  16. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  17. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, 05.
  18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  19. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
  20. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
  21. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
  22. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  23. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  25. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2015. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," Working Papers SDES-2015-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
  26. Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  28. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
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