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Citations for "Implementation with evidence"

by Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier

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  1. Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  2. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Clausen, Andrew, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  5. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  7. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper Series 592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-301, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2012.
  9. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  11. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  12. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2015. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," Working Papers SDES-2015-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
  13. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  14. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  15. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  16. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  17. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 8771, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  18. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  19. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal," Discussion Paper Series 616, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  20. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, 05.
  21. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  22. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
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