Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
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References listed on IDEAS
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018.
"Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
- Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1603, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsFull implementation; Direct mechanism; Verifiable information; Rank-order tournaments;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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