Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes
A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state.
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- Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009.
"Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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