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Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
  2. Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2023. "The (not so) quiet period: Communication by ECB decision-makers during monetary policy blackout days☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
  3. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1032, August.
  4. Farvaque, Etienne & Matsueda, Norimichi & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2009. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 534-546, December.
  5. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," DULBEA Working Papers 07-11.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, August.
  7. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  8. George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2013. "Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 271-295, March.
  9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7684 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
  11. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
  12. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
  13. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.
  14. Abdulrahman Alrabiah & Steve Drew, 2020. "Proactive Management of Regulatory Policy Ripple Effects via a Computational Hierarchical Change Management Structure," Risks, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-29, May.
  15. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2002. "Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility," Economics Series Working Papers 132, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
  17. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
  18. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
  19. Patnaik, Ila & Pandey, Radhika, 2020. "Moving to Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 20/316, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
  20. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
  21. Brigitte Desroches & Sharon Kozicki & Laure Simon, 2024. "Monetary Policy Governance: Bank of Canada Practices to Support Policy Effectiveness," Discussion Papers 2024-14, Bank of Canada.
  22. Dal Bo, Ernesto, 2006. "Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 573-599, May.
  23. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
  24. Alberto Alesina & Alberto Carrasquilla & Roberto Steiner, 2000. "The Central Bank in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 2458, Fedesarrollo.
  25. Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  26. Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
  27. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committees in Action: Is There Room for Improvement?," Staff Working Papers 07-6, Bank of Canada.
  28. Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "The (Not So) Quiet Period: Communication by ECB Decision-makers during Monetary Policy Blackout Days," CEPR Discussion Papers 15735, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  29. Ernesto Dal Bó, 2007. "Bribing Voters," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 789-803, October.
  30. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.
  31. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
  32. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
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