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Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States

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  • George A. Krause
  • David E. Lewis
  • James W. Douglas

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  • George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2013. "Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 271-295, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:32:y:2013:i:2:p:271-295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2006. "Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 770-787, July.
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    21. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    22. Richard Boylan, 2008. "Political distortions in state forecasts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 411-427, September.
    23. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    24. Spulber, Daniel F & Besanko, David, 1992. "Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 126-154, March.
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    26. Bretschneider, Stuart & Gorr, Wilpen, 1992. "Economic, organizational, and political influences on biases in forecasting state sales tax receipts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 457-466, March.
    27. Spence, David B, 1999. "Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 413-459, June.
    28. Plümper, Thomas & Troeger, Vera E., 2011. "Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition: Properties, Reliability, and Instruments," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 147-164, April.
    29. Beck, Nathaniel, 2011. "Of Fixed-Effects and Time-Invariant Variables," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 119-122, April.
    30. Skidmore, Mark, 1999. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between State and Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 77-102, April.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    3. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    4. Jeffrey Swanson & Namhoon Ki, 2020. "When Would a Democratic Governor Increase Social Welfare Funding? The Joint Moderation of a State's Economy and a Governor's Budgetary Authority," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(5), pages 634-656, September.
    5. Bong Hwan Kim & Sounman Hong, 2019. "Political change and turnovers: How do political principals consider organizational, individual, and performance information?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 291-308, December.
    6. Fidel Perez‐Sebastian & Ohad Raveh, 2019. "Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 1112-1164, August.
    7. Thomas L. Spreen & Juan P. Martinez Guzman, 2022. "Information sharing and state revenue forecasting performance," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 54-73, December.
    8. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Political Myopia, Public Debt," OxCarre Working Papers 200, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.

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